Loyola University Chicago Law Journal
Volume 45
Issue 3 2014 Spring
2014

Are SOX and Dodd-Frank Securities Law? The
Answer is Up in the Air
Geoffrey Christopher Rapp
University of Toledo College of Law

Follow this and additional works at: http://lawecommons.luc.edu/luclj
Part of the Securities Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Geoffrey C. Rapp, Are SOX and Dodd-Frank Securities Law? The Answer is Up in the Air, 45 Loy. U. Chi. L. J. 537 (2014).
Available at: http://lawecommons.luc.edu/luclj/vol45/iss3/2

This Conference Essay & Remark is brought to you for free and open access by LAW eCommons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Loyola
University Chicago Law Journal by an authorized administrator of LAW eCommons. For more information, please contact law-library@luc.edu.

Article 2

RAPP.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

4/1/2014 10:48 PM

Are SOX and Dodd-Frank Securities Laws?
The Answer is Up in the Air*
Geoffrey Christopher Rapp**
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................... 537
I. THE JUDICIAL CASE AGAINST THE SECURITIES LAWS ................... 539
II. INTERPRETING SOX AND DODD-FRANK ........................................ 543
III. WHAT ARE THE CORE FEATURES OF SECURITIES LAWS? .............. 547
CONCLUSION......................................................................................... 551
INTRODUCTION
The securities laws have acquired a bad name. Once viewed as
something akin to “the Savior of All Humanity,”1 they have fallen into
disrepute.
Partly in response to perceived flaws in private securities litigation as
a tool for detecting and deterring fraud in financial markets by
supplementing the government’s limited enforcement resources,
scholars—myself included—have argued in favor of alternative
approaches.2 Congress has on two occasions found cause to explore
these “third ways”3 to combat securities fraud. In the Sarbanes-Oxley
* UP IN THE AIR (Paramount Pictures 2009).
** Harold A. Anderson Professor of Law and Values, University of Toledo College of Law.
1. E. Thomas Sullivan & Robert B. Thompson, The Supreme Court and Private Law: The
Vanishing Importance of Securities and Antitrust, 53 EMORY L.J. 1571, 1580 (2004).
2. See Geoffrey Christopher Rapp, Beyond Protection: Invigorating Incentives for SarbanesOxley Corporate and Securities Fraud Whistleblowers, 87 B.U. L. REV. 91 (2007) [hereinafter
Rapp, Beyond Protection] (arguing that Congress should adopt a bounty model for securities
fraud whistleblowers); Geoffrey Christopher Rapp, False Claims, not Securities Fraud: Towards
Corporate Governance by Whistleblowers, 15 NEXUS J. L. & POL’Y 55 (2010) [hereinafter Rapp,
False Claims, not Securities Fraud] (suggesting the use of the False Claims Act to facilitate
payouts to whistleblowers for companies that had received federal bailout funds).
3. A “third-way” legal or policy solution draws on the insights of two dominant approaches
and seeks to harness the “strengths of each in order to avoid the perils of the other.” Shelley
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Act of 2002 (“SOX”),4 Congress extended anti-retaliation protection to
employees who engaged in the “protected activity” of blowing the
whistle on violations of the securities laws.5 Because SOX provided
protection but no “carrot,” I argued in several previous articles that
policymakers should develop a “bounty” scheme for securities tipsters.6
Congress embraced that notion, to a degree, in the Dodd-Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (“Dodd-Frank”).7
While the whistleblower protection provision of SOX and the bounty
provision of Dodd-Frank attracted considerable media attention,8 they
have only recently begun to produce a body of case law interpreting the
scope of each statute’s coverage. Courts have begun to deal with the
same kind of thorny issues of statutory interpretation in regard to
SOX—and may soon confront similar issues with Dodd-Frank9—that
they have confronted in interpreting the securities laws in their eightdecade history.
In this Essay, I attempt to uncover whether the whistleblower
provisions of SOX and Dodd-Frank should be viewed as “securities
laws” subject to the sort of restrictive judicial interpretation that has
been so prominent in recent decades. The Supreme Court, this fall,
confronted a difficult case of statutory interpretation involving SOX,
and should it choose to follow the policy-infused approach to
construction it has used in recent private securities cases, we should not
be surprised to see a decision that sharply undercuts the scope and
coverage of SOX’s protections. Should the same sort of interpretation
arise in future Dodd-Frank cases, the holes I have identified in that
Cavalieri, Between Victim and Agent: A Third-Way Feminist Account of Trafficking for Sex Work,
86 IND. L.J. 1409, 1445 (2011).
4. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered
sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.).
5. Rapp, Beyond Protection, supra note 2, at 95.
6. See id. at 10 (discussing Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) bounties versus
other bounty systems).
7. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111203, 124 Stat. 1376 (codified in scattered sections of the U.S. Code).
8. Rapp, False Claims, not Securities Fraud, supra note 2, at 104.
9. Because the bounty scheme in Dodd-Frank is largely an administrative one, however, it
may be that the SEC, rather than the courts, will have to face questions of interpretation. Still,
courts have begun to confront some difficult questions of statutory interpretation relating to the
non-bounty components of Dodd-Frank. For instance, Dodd-Frank’s reinforcing anti-retaliation
provisions for securities fraud whistleblowers are ambiguous as to whether an employee is
protected if she protests securities violations internally, or only if she reports them to the SEC.
See Jenna Green, SEC Argues Whistleblowers Can Report Internally, LEGAL TIMES, Feb. 20,
2014, http://www.nationallawjournal.com/legaltimes/id=1392911370189?slreturn=2014012510
2254#.
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statute10 may widen even further.
Part I of this Essay describes the Supreme Court’s policy-based
concerns about securities litigation, which have prompted a steady
constriction of the reach of doctrine in this area. Part II discusses
Lawson v. FMR LLC, an example of a difficult question of statutory
interpretation that has arisen in connection with the new whistleblower
statutes. Part III seeks to resolve whether the bases for the judicial
suspicion of securities litigation will apply with equal force when the
Court confronts questions of interpretation in Lawson and future
whistleblower cases.
I. THE JUDICIAL CASE AGAINST THE SECURITIES LAWS
For nearly four decades after their enactment in the wake of the stock
market crash of 1929 and the resulting economic crisis, the United
States Supreme Court interpreted federal securities laws broadly.11
Rule 10b-5,12 the core anti-fraud provision drafted by the Securities and
Exchange Commission (“SEC”), was to be interpreted to serve the
“broad remedial purposes” of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.13
The tide turned in the mid-1970s, when the Court’s securities
opinions took a decidedly restrictive tone.14 In 1975, the Court
characterized the body of federal securities laws as a “judicial oak”
spawned from a mere “legislative acorn” and warned broadly that
securities litigation was “vexatious.”15 In the years that have followed,
the Court’s policy view on securities litigation has, at times, seemed to
grow even more disdainful. The Court recently compared civil
securities litigation to the crime of extortion, describing potential
defendants as “innocent” rather than simply not liable.16
Policy concerns have shaped securities jurisprudence in ways perhaps
more pronounced than in other major areas of federal litigation for two
reasons.
First, many securities cases “involve complicated and specialized

10. Geoffrey Christopher Rapp, Mutiny by the Bounties? The Attempt to Reform Wall Street
by the New Whistleblower Provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act, 2012 BYU L. REV. 73, 90–95
(2012) [hereinafter Rapp, Mutiny by the Bounties].
11. Sullivan & Thompson, supra note 1, at 1580.
12. 17 C.F.R. 240.10b-5 (2013).
13. J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964).
14. Sullivan & Thompson, supra note 1, at 1582.
15. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 739–40 (1975).
16. Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, 552 U.S. 148, 162 (2008).
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questions of statutory construction.”17 With the statutory text and
legislative history limited in usefulness, the Court has (and federal
courts following its lead have) been guided by policy in restricting the
scope of the securities laws in a number of ways.
Second, where previous expansion in the coverage of the securities
laws, such as the Court’s embrace of a private right of action in Borak,18
was motivated by policy goals, countervailing policy concerns could be
used to justify restricting the laws in later interpretations. 19 The Court’s
characterization of securities litigation as “vexatious” “has been
extraordinarily influential in the development of securities fraud
jurisprudence.”20 Three decades of “judicial constriction” have been
the result.21
Of particular concern to courts—and Congress—are class action
lawsuits, widely viewed as potentially “abusive.”22 Class action
securities lawsuits are theoretically problematic, since they suffer from
an inherent “circularity” problem.23 Damages are paid by a corporation
but ultimately born by its current shareholders. Damages are paid to the
corporation’s former shareholders, or some subsection of its
shareholders. Diversified investors are equally likely to pay in a class
action lawsuit as they are to receive a payment; thus, a priori a rational
investor should be hostile to class action lawsuits in that plaintiffs’
attorneys will reap a sizable share of any settlement or judgment yet a
shareholder can equally expect to lose and to win.24 As a component of
an investor protection regime, then, the class action lawsuit seems
misplaced. Even though it may be that class actions have been the most
objectionable branch in the “judicial oak”25 of securities laws, the Court
has handed down restrictive rulings even in cases that were not class
actions,26 perhaps concerned that an expansionist view of securities
17. Sullivan & Thompson, supra note 1, at 1600.
18. Borak, 377 U.S. at 431.
19. Wendy Gerwick Couture, The End of the Vexatiousness Rationale, 41 SEC. REG. L.J. 301
(2013).
20. Id.
21. Marc I. Steinberg & Brent A. Kirby, The Assault on Section 11 of the Securities Act: A
Study in Judicial Activism, 63 RUTGERS L. REV. 1, 55 (2010).
22. See H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 31 (1995) (Conf. Rep.) (noting the “abusive practices” in
private securities litigation).
23. Verity Winship, Fair Funds and the SEC’s Compensation of Injured Investors, 60 FLA. L.
REV. 1103, 1128 (2008).
24. Rapp, False Claims, not Securities Fraud, supra note 2, at 104.
25. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 739–40 (1975).
26. For instance, the Court adopted a restrictive view of the meaning of the term “prospectus”
in Gustafson v. Alloyd, 513 U.S. 561 (1995). This case essentially involved a single plaintiff,
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laws even in non-aggregate litigation could be used in future class
action cases.
Because liability in a class action lawsuit can involve a maddeningly
high level of damages, moreover, there is a strong incentive to settle any
securities lawsuit that survives motions on the pleadings. There is too
much risk for most defendants to “bet the company” so these cases are
rarely tried, and discovery itself can be so expensive 27 that even
proceeding to summary judgment appears to be a bad bet for most
defendants. Therefore, private litigants will almost never try a
securities case, and much of the legislative counter-revolution against
securities law has involved targeting the way in which motions on the
pleadings are considered.
Securities lawsuits are rarely the subject of full-blown trials. Instead,
defendants either win a motion to dismiss, or the case will settle.
Because of this, facts matter less than law in resolving securities
disputes and the importance of legal interpretations (particularly those
offered by appellate courts and the Supreme Court) is magnified. As
the Court has grown more and more suspicious of the underlying legal
framework regulating private securities litigation, it has repeatedly
adopted restrictive readings of the laws’ scope based on its policy
preferences.
While scholars, such as one of this symposium’s presenters,
Professor Couture,28 have criticized the use of “policy heuristics” to
resolve securities laws disputes in the Court,29 these calls have to date,
in a wide variety of cases, fallen on deaf ears.30 Consider, for example,
because it will lead into the discussion I embark upon in the next
section, the 2011 decision in Janus Capital Group, Inc., et al. v. First
Derivative Traders.31
Plaintiff First Derivative, representing an investor class, sued Janus
Capital Management, LLC (“JCM”), a wholly owned subsidiary of
Janus Capital Group, Inc. (“JCG”), a major mutual fund provider. The
mutual funds were organized as a Massachusetts business trust, the
Wind Point Partners, L.P. The Court’s conclusion in that case was driven largely by a view that a
broad interpretation of section 12(2) would be “bad policy.” Elliott J. Weiss, Securities Act
Section 12(2) After Gustafson v. Alloyd Co.: What Questions Remain?, 50 BUS. LAW. 1209, 1214
(1995).
27. Rapp, Beyond Protection, supra note 2, at 104.
28. See Wendy Gerwick Couture, Around the World of Securities Fraud in Eighty Motions to
Dismiss, 45 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 553 (2014).
29. Couture, supra note 19, at 5.
30. But see id. at 13–14.
31. 131 S. Ct. 2296 (2011).
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Janus Investment Fund (“JIF”). JCG created a separate, wholly-owned
subsidiary entity, JCM, which became the administrator of mutual funds
under the JIF umbrella.32 The plaintiffs asserted fraud in connection
with JIF’s statements about the suitability of certain funds for market
timing.33 The prospectus in question was written by JCM employees
but submitted to investors by JIF.34 The claim was advanced under the
familiar anti-fraud provisions, section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.35
Rule 10b-5 makes it unlawful for any person “[t]o make any untrue
statement” of material fact in connection with the purchase or sale of
securities.36 To be liable, said the Court, JCM must have “‘made’ the
material misstatements in the prospectus.”37 The Court concluded that
JCM could not be held liable. One “‘makes’ a statement by stating
it.”38 Turning to rules of grammar to construe the rule, the Court opined
that “to make a statement” is the equivalent of “to state,” just as “to
make a proclamation” is the equivalent of “to proclaim” or “to make a
promise” is the equivalent of “to promise.”39
With a carriage return and an indent, the Court hurdled from
grammar and dictionaries to the following conclusion: “[T]he maker of
a statement is the person or entity with ultimate authority over the
statement, including its content and how to communicate it. . . . One
who prepares or publishes a statement on behalf of another is not its
maker.”40 A speechwriter does not “make” a speech—the credit or
blame goes to the person who delivers the speech.41 Only the party
listed as the “Filer” of a prospectus—in this case, JIF—is the “maker”
of the statement and subject to potential liability. 42 JIF and JCM are
“legally separate entities,” which “observed” proper “corporate
formalities” and maintained boards more independent than required by
32. Id. at 2300.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 2312.
35. Id. at 2301.
36. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(b) (2013).
37. Janus Capital Grp., Inc., 131 S. Ct. at 2301.
38. Id. at 2302.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. This analogy is an odd one. While a speech-deliverer has “ultimate control” over what
comes out of her mouth, a speechwriter may still have “control” over things the speech deliverer
doesn’t care to overrule. Couldn’t a speechwriter slip something in that a speechmaker might not
notice? And doesn’t a speechwriter get some credit if her identity is revealed? See generally
ROBERT SCHLESINGER, WHITE HOUSE GHOSTS: PRESIDENTS AND THEIR SPEECHWRITERS (2008)
(describing the “crucial” role played by Presidential speechwriters).
42. Janus Capital Grp., Inc., 131 S. Ct. at 2305.
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law.43
The Court’s interpretation is certainly a plausible reading of Rule
10b-5, but as Justice Breyer pointed out in dissent, it is not compelled—
the “English language does not impose upon the word ‘make’
boundaries of the kind the majority finds determinative.”44 Clearly,
policy concerns favoring interpreting the securities laws along “narrow
dimensions” played a role.45
The Court’s reasoning is bad news for my four-old daughter. One of
her favorite activities is baking cookies and brownies (and following up
by eating them). Under the Court’s interpretation, however, she really
did not “bake” brownies if I am the one with ultimate control (for
prudential reasons) of how long they stay in the oven or at what
temperature they are to be cooked. Now, I have to prohibit her from
claiming, when handing out treats, that she “baked” the cookies.46
II. INTERPRETING SOX AND DODD-FRANK
This term, the Court considered a case giving it the opportunity to
interpret the text of SOX’s whistleblower protection. In Lawson v.
FMR, LLC,47 the Court granted certiorari to review a decision by the
First Circuit Court of Appeals that had read narrowly the scope of SOX
protection to dismiss a case filed by the employees of a contractor of a
publicly held company.48
Section 806 of SOX creates an anti-retaliation provision to protect
whistleblowers who raise concerns about financial fraud. As codified,
that provision provides:
(a) Whistleblower protection for employees of publicly traded
companies—No company with a class of securities registered under
section 12 [of the ‘34 Act], or that is required to file reports under
section 15(d) [of the ‘34 Act] . . . or any officer, employee, contractor,
43. Id.
44. Id. at 2307 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
45. Id. at 2302 (majority opinion) (citing Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta,
552 U.S. 148, 167 (2008)). For a further discussion of Janus, see Anthony Sallah, Scheme
Liability: Conduct Beyond the Misrepresentations, Deceptive Acts, and Possible Janus
Intervention, 45 U. TOL. L. REV. 181, 193–95 (2013).
46. This would not be the case, of course, if she were to “bake” the goodies in an “Easy Bake
Oven” designed for use by children. Being a products liability teacher as well, however, I am too
familiar with the cases dealing with such a device to allow it into my own home. See King v.
Hasbro, Inc., No. 07-4001, 2009 WL 3157319 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 28, 2009) (plaintiff suffered
injuries from “Easy Bake Oven”); Overen v. Hasbro, Inc., No. 07-1430, 2007 WL 2695792 (D.
Minn. Sept. 27, 2007) (same).
47. Lawson v. FMR LLC, 670 F.3d 61 (1st Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 2387 (2013).
48. See id. at 68.
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subcontractor, or agent of such company . . . may [retaliate] against an
employee . . . [for protected whistleblowing activity].49

In Lawson, the plaintiffs were employed by private companies
created by Fidelity, a family of mutual funds, to provide the
administrative services to Fidelity funds. Employed by privately held
entities, the whistleblowers protested fraud on the part of FMR, LLC,
which operated to the disadvantage of shareholders of Fidelity funds
(which were public companies). The Funds themselves, while public,
had essentially no employees of their own. The Court confronted the
question of the scope of SOX’s protection. Does it create a civil cause
of action for employees of contractors of public companies, or only for
employees of public companies?
The statutory text is amenable to two plausible interpretations. The
plaintiffs, supported by the United States, pointed to the phrase “an
employee” and argued that it includes “an employee” of a “contractor”
of a public company. To read the coverage narrowly, argued the United
States, would effectively exempt mutual funds from SOX’s protection
since the covered public companies in the mutual fund industry have no
employees of their own who would be entitled to bring SOX antiretaliation claims.50
The defendants pointed to the caption of the statute—seemingly
limiting its reach to employees of public companies.51 The Court was
thus given the opportunity to clarify the usefulness of statutory captions
in its opinion. Captions might confirm the meaning of terms contained
in the text,52 or, alternatively, provide only “short-hand references” that
could not be used to limit a broadly delineated statutory right.53
To the defendants, the statutory provision included the phrase
“contractor[s] . . . or agent[s]” to guard against the possibility that a
public company would retaliate against one of its employees by
retaining a third-party contractor to actually conduct the retaliation.54
Defendants—and the First Circuit, in siding with them—explained the
inclusion of the “contractor” language as an attempt to guard against the
“ax-wielding specialist.”55 The First Circuit “not[ed]” the Seventh

49. 18 U.S.C. § 1514A (2012).
50. Brief for the United States as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 7–8, Lawson v. FMR
LLC, No. 12-3 (U.S. Aug. 7, 2013), 2013 WL 4049264, at *7.
51. Lawson, 670 F.3d at 68.
52. INS v. Nat’l Ctr. for Immigrants’ Rights, Inc., 502 U.S. 183, 189 (1991).
53. Bhd. of R.R. Trainmen v. Balt. & O.R. Co., 331 U.S. 519, 528 (1947).
54. Lawson, 670 F.3d at 67.
55. Id. at 69 n.11 (citing Fleszar v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 598 F.3d 912, 915 (7th Cir. 2010)).
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Circuit’s reference to “the character George Clooney played in ‘Up in
the Air.’”56
In its brief to the Supreme Court, the
defendants/respondents took up this analogy. 57 The “ax-wielding”
specialist “scenario was depicted in the 2009 movie ‘Up in the Air,’ in
which George Clooney’s character works for a private company ‘whose
contracts are in corporate downsizing. In other words, they fire
people.’”58 Clooney’s character in the film, derived from Walter Kirn’s
novel of the same name,59 is an obsessive-compulsive corporate
consultant with a yen to achieve super-elite status in frequent flyer
programs.60 Congress, supposed the defendants, meant only to prevent
covered public companies from retaining such outside support to
conduct retaliation, not to extend the coverage of SOX protection to
employees of privately held firms.61
Up in the Air does not present precisely the scenario for which the
respondents invoke it, in that Clooney’s character is not retained to
retaliate against a whistleblower. However, his firm is clearly valued by
its clients for mitigating litigation risks associated with terminating
client employees. In one passage, Clooney’s character is retained by the
manufacturer of a secret-formula sports-energy drink to fire three senior
sales and marketing executives.62
The character’s job was to
“neutralize the threat from the insiders who might well retaliate, and
possibly scuttle the whole enterprise.”63 As he delivered the bad news
to the executives, corporate guards were searching their desks for
documents “that might play into the hands of legal foes” suing the
company over the negative effects of its sports drinks on consumers.64
Although the Court’s task in Lawson was a “seemingly simple
exercise in statutory interpretation,”65 the ambiguity in the statute, and
56. Id.
57. Brief of Respondents, Lawson v. FMR LLC, No. 12-3 (U.S. Sept. 30, 2013), 2013 WL
5441390, at *24–25; see also Reply Brief of Petitioner, Lawson, No. 12-3 (U.S. Oct. 30, 2013),
2013 WL 5863751, at *6.
58. Brief of Respondents, supra note 57, at *25 (quoting Up in the Air, Plot Summary, IMBD,
http://www.imdb.com/title/tt1193138/plotsummary (last visited Feb. 14, 2014)).
59. WALTER KIRN, UP IN THE AIR (2001).
60. UP IN THE AIR (Paramount Pictures 2009).
61. Lawson, 670 F.3d at 67.
62. KIRN, supra note 59, at 247–48.
63. Id. at 248.
64. Id.
65. Geoffrey Rapp, Argument Preview: Eligibility of employees of public company
contractors for Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblower protection, SCOTUSBLOG (Oct. 30, 2013, 11:00
AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/10/argument-preview-eligibility-of-employees-of-publiccompany-contractors-for-sarbanes-oxley-whistleblower-protection/ [hereinafter Rapp, Argument
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the lack of any legislative guidance, left open the question of how to
resolve the statute’s scope. Were the Court to apply the antivexatiousness policy heuristic familiar to securities lawyers, one would
have expected the Court to be restrictive in its reading.
The Court released its decision—a divided one—on March 4, 2014.
Writing for the majority, Justice Ginsburg reversed the First Circuit and
held that SOX protection extended to the employees of contractors of
public companies when those employees were retaliated against because
they engaged in protected activity.66
Two preliminary comments about the Court’s decision in Lawson
that bear on the question posed in this Essay.
First, the majority decision cited very little in the way of securities
law precedent; instead, it spent much of its time discussing employee
whistleblower protections in other statutory schemes (such as a statute
which provides whistleblower protection in airline safety cases). The
majority cites tax cases,67 a number of whistleblower cases in other
areas,68 and a number of provisions of securities statutes and secondary
sources on securities law, but it doesn’t cite a single case that would
ordinarily be offered as an example of a “securities law” decision.
By contrast, the dissent (authored by Justice Sotomayor) prominently
cites the classic “vexatiousness” case from the securities law pantheon,
Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores.69
Second, a disagreement arose between the majority and the dissent on
whether the Department of Labor’s Administrative Review Board
(“ARB”) was entitled to administrative deference.70 The dissent argued
that if any administrative agency was to be entitled to deference in SOX
interpretations, it should be the SEC (which had not issued an opinion
on the coverage of the anti-retaliation provision).71 The majority, while
avoiding ruling on the issue because it decided that the text of the
statute provided a sufficient basis for reversal, appeared inclined to
afford deference to the Department of Labor, the agency to which
Preview].
66. Lawson v. FMR LLC, No. 12-3, slip. op. at 1 (U.S. Mar. 4, 2014).
67. Id. at 24 n.16.
68. Id. at 28 n.20.
69. Id. at 8 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). Justice Sotomayor cites Blue Chips for the proposition
that a Congressional choice to depart from an available, easy-to-follow model should not be
“presume[d] . . . to be accidental.” The specific line in Blue Chips cited by Justice Sotomayor is:
“When Congress wished to provide a remedy to those who neither purchase nor sell securities, it
had little trouble in doing so expressly.” 421 U.S. 723, 734 (1975).
70. Lawson, No. 12-3, slip op. at 8 n.6 (majority opinion).
71. Id. at 17–18 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).

RAPP.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2014]

Are SOX and Dodd-Frank Securities Laws?

4/1/2014 10:48 PM

547

“Congress delegated [the] responsibility [for interpreting SOX
whistleblower protections].”72
III. WHAT ARE THE CORE FEATURES OF SECURITIES LAWS?
The basic concept of American securities laws involves a search for
mechanisms to ensure investors are protected from fraud: “In short,
Congress wanted to prevent fraud, deceit, and misrepresentation in
securities transactions.”73 In this sense, it seems that both SOX and
Dodd-Frank could be viewed as “securities laws,” although Dodd-Frank
more clearly so.
SOX sought to take advantage of the fact that employees had
valuable information about ongoing securities fraud, yet might stay
silent because blowing the whistle involved too great a risk of
termination.74 But at the same time, SOX is more about protecting
employees than it is about protecting investors—even if an employee
inaccurately perceives fraud, she may be protected,75 and there has been
little indication that any SOX complaints lead to governmental
intervention.76 SOX’s title for section 1514A is “Civil action to protect
against retaliation in fraud cases.” SOX is about protecting against
retaliation, more than about the fraud itself. Dodd-Frank, more directly,
is about investor protection: the law sought to “put more cops on the
beat” to assist the SEC in its investor protection mission.77
The fact that both statutes serve, in varying degrees of directness,
investor-protection goals, however, would not make them subject to the
suspicious interpretation the Court has employed in securities cases. It
is not the goal of investor protection that makes securities cases
problematic, in the Court’s mind, but instead the way in which such
cases are litigated and the exposure to which even “innocent”

72. Id. at 8 n.6 (majority opinion).
73. Eric C. Chaffee, Standing Under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5: The Continued Validity of
the Forced Seller Exception to the Purchaser-Seller Requirement, 11 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 843, 886
(2009).
74. Rapp, Beyond Protection, supra note 2, at 109.
75. Marc I. Steinberg & Seth A. Kaufman, Minimizing Corporate Liability Exposure When
the Whistle Blows in the Post Sarbanes-Oxley Era, 30 J. CORP. L. 445, 452 (2005).
76. Geoffrey Christopher Rapp, Four Signal Moments in Whistleblower Law: 1983–2013, 30
HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 389, 395–96 (2013).
77. Rapp, Mutiny by the Bounties, supra note 10, at 89 (quoting Industry Perspectives on the
Obama Administration’s Financial Regulatory Reform Proposals: Hearing Before the H. Comm.
on Fin. Servs., 111th Cong. 62 (2009) (statement of William J. Brodsky, Chairman and Chief
Executive Officer, Chicago Board of Options Exchange), available at http://democrats.finan
cialservices.house.gov/Hearings/hearingDetails.aspx?NewsID=1150).
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defendants may be subjected. Therefore, to determine if the Court will
find SOX and Dodd-Frank claims “vexatious,” one has to plumb why
securities laws have fallen into disrepute. The Court has worried that
widely expanded plaintiff classes lead to heightened potential
damages,78 that defendants may be required to expend “large sums” in
settlement negotiations and pretrial legal proceedings,79 about the
possibility that new classes of defendants could be targeted in spite of
innocence,80 and over the large number of groundless claims81 in the
securities docket.
Professor Couture identifies four aspects of private securities
litigation that raise special policy concerns:
(1) a plaintiff asserting an unmeritorious claim can nonetheless avoid
dismissal and summary judgment and thereby extract settlement
value; (2) a plaintiff asserting an unmeritorious claim can extract
settlement value by performing extensive discovery that disrupts the
business; (3) a plaintiff can establish crucial elements of the claim
with uncorroborated, oral testimony; and (4) the court’s power to
award attorneys’ fees [to defendants targeted by] vexatious litigation
is “sharply circumscribed.”82

Are these concerns present with regard to SOX and Dodd-Frank? Let
us begin with SOX. The fear of unmeritorious claims by “shirking
employees” seeking to “fend off scrutiny of their performance” has been
lodged against the SOX provision.83 SOX claims may be even less
amenable to dismissal on the pleadings than private securities class
actions. Securities class actions are subject to easier dismissal under the
heightened pleading requirements of the Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act of 1995.84 Moreover, SOX claims may hinge on “factual”
issues that make them poor candidates for dismissal on the pleadings. 85
The Department of Labor’s ARB “highly disfavor[s]” Rule 12 motions
as “impractical” within the confines of its practices.86 Occupational
Safety and Health Administration investigators, charged with initial

78. Couture, supra note 19, at 2.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 3.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 7.
83. Larry E. Ribstein, Sarbanes-Oxley After Three Years, 2005 N.Z. L. REV. 365, 371 (2005).
84. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b) (2012).
85. See Sylvester v. Parexel Int’l LLC, No. 07-123, 2011 WL 2517148 (Dep’t of Labor May
25, 2011) (holding that heightened pleading standards for SOX claims are inappropriate because
such claims “involve inherently factual issues”).
86. Id.
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evaluation of SOX complaints, are permitted to consider facts outside of
the pleadings during preliminary phases of a SOX investigation.87 On
the other hand, strict interpretations of various SOX provisions such as
the statute of limitations have led to quite high dismissal rates. 88
The scope of discovery in SOX cases has been “broadly construed,”
with the usual methods available during the administrative proceedings
of a complaint.89 Protective orders are hard to obtain because the
movant “must demonstrate good cause with specificity” to be entitled to
such protection.90
Still, the costs of discovery in defending
whistleblower cases may not be unreasonably high. Whistleblower
cases are not class actions, in which “company-wide policies or
practices” might be relevant and therefore discoverable, dramatically
raising the costs of discovery for defendants.91 Discovery costs in a
whistleblower claim based on SOX are probably closer to the level in a
typical employment discrimination case—which defense attorneys do
not uniformly view to be excessive.92
Can a SOX claim be proven with uncorroborated oral testimony? A
whistleblower must establish that she engaged in protected activity in
order to be covered. There may indeed be circumstances in which a
whistleblower can only prove she made a report by testifying (orally)
that she did so where a supervisor has denied that such a report was
made.93 Quite a few whistleblowers, however, will copy corporate
documents before leaving a company and offer those up as evidence in
a subsequent proceeding.94
87. Stephen B. Stern, Strategies for Analyzing and Responding to Sarbanes-Oxley
Whistleblower Claims, in COMPLYING WITH SARBANES-OXLEY’S WHISTLEBLOWER PROVISIONS
7, 13 (Eddie Fournier ed., 2009).
88. Richard Moberly, Unfulfilled Expectations: An Empirical Analysis of Why Sarbanes-Oxley
Whistleblowers Rarely Win, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 65, 107 (2007).
89. Robert B. Fitzpatrick, Current Developments in Employment Law: The Obama Years at
Mid-Term, 2002 A.B.A. SEC. LAB. & EMP. L. 1505.
90. Id.
91. Robert G. Bone & David S. Evans, Class Certification and the Substantive Merits, 51
DUKE L.J. 1251, 1300 (2002).
92. See THOMAS E. WILLGING & EMERY G. LEE III, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., IN THEIR WORDS:
ATTORNEY VIEWS ABOUT COSTS AND PROCEDURES IN FEDERAL CIVIL LITIGATION 8 (Mar.
2010), available at http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/costciv3.pdf/$file/costciv3.pdf
(respondents to one survey “reported varying experiences in employment discrimination
litigation, some finding it costly and others not”).
93. Richard R. Carlson, Citizen Employees, 70 LA. L. REV. 237, 298 (2009) (when this
happens, “the fact-finder will need to choose between one party’s self-serving testimony and the
other party’s self-serving testimony”).
94. James Fisher et al., Privatizing Regulation: Whistleblowing and Bounty Hunting in the
Financial Services Industry, 19 DICK. J. INT’L L. 117, 134 (2000).
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To be sure, companies targeted in a SOX complaint will rarely
receive an award to cover their fees or costs. While some state
whistleblower statutes have included provisions to allow for the
imposition of fees for spurious complaints95 and the False Claims Act
contains a narrow provision to that effect,96 SOX did not select that
model.
Under Dodd-Frank, neither of the first two concerns would apply
because the plaintiff has no control over an SEC investigation launched
as a result of her tips. There is no “dismissal” of a whistleblower claim
other than when the Commission declines to proceed further in an
investigation or civil action. The whistleblower has no ability to extract
a settlement from the target firm directly. While a whistleblower might
report a tip to the SEC armed with little more than the whistleblower’s
own words, one doubts that, in the absence of additional support, the
SEC would take further action.
In Dodd-Frank, the SEC has no power to award fees or costs to the
target of a spurious whistleblower bounty submission.97 The SEC was
confident that its rules impose standards sufficient to weed out
“frivolous submissions.”98 To date, Dodd-Frank has resisted calls for a
broad cost and fee-shifting measure to benefit wrongfully targeted
defendants.99
On balance, the concerns about “vexatiousness” that have driven
courts to adopt highly formalistic and strict readings of the securities
laws do not appear particularly pronounced in the realm of SOX and
Dodd-Frank whistleblowers.
Yet the superficial connection to
“securities” may lead courts to a more skeptical posture than law and
policy would require.

95. Valerie P. Kirk & Ann Clarke Snell, The Texas Whistleblower Act: Time for a Change, 26
TEX. TECH. L. REV. 75, 103 (1995); Matt A. Vega, Beyond Incentives: Making Corporate
Whistleblowing Moral in the New Era of Dodd-Frank Act “Bounty Hunting,” 45 CONN. L. REV.
483, 492 (2012).
96. Andrew M. Hyer, The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly: The Unnecessarily Broad Impact of
Qui Tam Civil False Claims Act Cases on Rural Health Care Providers, 23 HEALTH MATRIX
459, 468–69 (2013).
97. See generally Section 21F of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Exchange Act Release
No. 34-64545, 76 Fed. Reg. 34,300, 34,303 (June 13, 2011) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240,
249) (discussing the rationales for declining to include an enforcement provision that would allow
the SEC to assess fees and/or costs for non-meritorious or frivolous complaints).
98. Id. at 34,303.
99. Patrick A. Barthle II, Note, Whistling Rogues: A Comparative Analysis of the Dodd-Frank
Whistleblower Bounty Program, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1201, 1236–40 (2012).
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CONCLUSION
Lawson exposed a “central tension in interpreting SOX,” namely
“whether the statute should be read broadly, in that it is remedial and
ambitious, or narrowly, as has increasingly been the case in Supreme
Court decisions in securities fraud cases.”100 There is little reason to
equate SOX or Dodd-Frank with the policy concerns that have
prompted the Court, over the years, to be “vex[ed]” by securities
litigation. At the same time, the superficial connection between the
conduct targeted by a Dodd-Frank or SOX whistleblower and a private
securities class action may lead the Court to be formalistic and strict in
its construction of the two whistleblower provisions.

100. Rapp, Argument Preview, supra note 65.

